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Over the past two decades, China has transitioned from a major arms importer to a growing global arms exporter, leveraging state-led innovation, military-industrial integration, and a flexible approach to foreign military sales. With increasing investments in indigenous defense capabilities, China is no longer just modernizing its own armed forces—it is also reshaping global arms markets. While challenges remain, such as political trust issues and technology gaps compared to traditional exporters like the United States, Russia, and France, China’s footprint in the global defense economy is expanding steadily. This evolution carries significant implications for international security, regional dynamics, and the future of military technology proliferation.
State-Led Industrial Powerhouses and Military-Civil Fusion
China’s defense industrial base is characterized by the dominance of a few large, vertically integrated state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that function as the backbone of its military modernization and global defense export ambitions. These conglomerates operate under the strategic direction of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), a powerful agency under the State Council that manages the government’s ownership and oversight of national strategic industries. These SOEs are the key enablers of China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, which aims to harmonize commercial innovation with military applications to rapidly scale up national defense capabilities.
At the core of this structure are six “national champion” enterprises that lead different domains of defense manufacturing and innovation. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) spearheads the development of strategic weapons systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), satellite platforms, and space exploration technologies, including lunar and planetary missions. Its counterpart, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), focuses more on tactical systems such as cruise missiles, air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and microsatellites tailored for both domestic defense and export markets.
In the air domain, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) oversees the development and production of a wide array of manned and unmanned aircraft, including China’s flagship fighter jets like the J-10 and J-20. It also plays a key role in advancing avionics, stealth systems, and drone swarms. In the maritime sector, the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC)—the world’s largest shipbuilder—produces everything from aircraft carriers and submarines for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to merchant ships and dual-use maritime assets for civilian purposes. Together, CASC, CASIC, AVIC, and CSSC represent the technological muscle behind China’s growing projection of power on land, sea, air, and space.
Two other critical players underpin the PLA’s command, control, and ground warfare capabilities. The China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) is the PLA’s primary provider of military electronics, radar systems, cyberwarfare platforms, and secure communications infrastructure. CETC’s vast network of R&D labs has increasingly focused on AI-enhanced warfare systems and electronic countermeasures. Meanwhile, China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) is responsible for ground force equipment, including tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and munitions, as well as dual-use exports such as construction machinery and chemicals. NORINCO also plays a leading role in China’s arms exports to developing countries and has expanded its overseas operations into energy and infrastructure.
Together, these defense SOEs oversee thousands of subsidiaries, R&D centers, listed companies, and overseas manufacturing and logistics hubs, forming one of the most expansive military-industrial complexes in the world. Their strategic direction is closely managed by SASAC, which appoints key executives, monitors performance metrics, and ensures alignment with national priorities, such as those outlined in the Five-Year Plans and the long-term goal of military modernization by 2035. This centralized model offers China significant advantages in resource mobilization, coordination across sectors, and long-term planning. However, it also faces challenges including bureaucratic inertia, inefficiencies in innovation compared to private-sector models, and international scrutiny over transparency and dual-use proliferation.
As these conglomerates expand their global footprint, they are increasingly integrating commercial and military technologies for export, extending China’s influence into sensitive domains of global security and defense supply chains. From oil fields in Iraq to drone factories in the Middle East and port investments in strategic maritime corridors, China’s defense industrial strategy is no longer just about equipping its own military—it is about shaping the future of warfare and defense partnerships across the Global South and beyond.
Export Strategy: Politics, Profits, and Pragmatism
China’s arms export strategy is shaped by a mix of industrial capacity, geopolitical calculus, and ideological flexibility. Driven by sustained defense budget growth—averaging 7.2% annually between 2022 and 2024—China has pursued not only rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) but also a deliberate push to increase its footprint in the global arms market. Currently ranked as the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter (SIPRI, 2019–2023), China’s defense industrial complex uses cost competitiveness, agile customization, and diplomatic neutrality to capture markets often overlooked or off-limits to Western suppliers.
At the heart of China’s export appeal is its cost dominance. Platforms like the Wing Loong II UAV, priced at approximately $10 million, come in significantly cheaper than U.S. equivalents such as the MQ-9 Reaper, which can exceed $30 million. This affordability—often bundled with training, maintenance, and infrastructure support—makes Chinese systems attractive to middle-income and developing states. Additionally, China emphasizes a “non-interference” doctrine, avoiding restrictions on end-use or political alignment. This gives Beijing the flexibility to supply a wide array of customers, including pariah regimes such as Myanmar, Venezuela, and Iran, which face embargoes from Western nations.
Customization is another key strength. Chinese firms rapidly adapt weapons for the geographic and operational needs of buyers—producing sand-resistant drones for Gulf states, tropicalized sensors for Southeast Asia, or Arctic-capable systems for Russian partners. This responsiveness to local requirements, along with speedy delivery timelines and willingness to license production, has helped China displace traditional suppliers in regions like Africa and Central Asia.
China’s arms trade is also integrated with broader geopolitical and economic strategies. In several cases, arms deals are intertwined with Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. For instance, debt-heavy infrastructure projects in Pakistan or Cambodia are coupled with discounted JF-17 fighters or missile systems, leveraging debt-trap diplomacy to secure long-term influence. Similarly, China supplies dual-use platforms that can be militarized post-sale—civilian drones by companies like DJI have been repurposed for artillery targeting and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) missions in conflicts like Ukraine.
However, this aggressive export model is not without risks. Chinese weapons have turned up in proliferation hotspots and have been used in controversial operations. FN-6 MANPADS have been documented in the hands of the Houthi rebels in Yemen and Wagner-affiliated militias in Sudan. Armed CH-4 drones have been deployed in civilian conflict zones such as Ethiopia’s Tigray region, raising concerns about Beijing’s accountability. Meanwhile, AI-powered surveillance systems sold to countries like Algeria and Serbia are being used for domestic repression, bolstering authoritarian governance through technology.
Beyond transactional sales, China is institutionalizing its arms diplomacy. It has established training centers for UAVs in countries like Saudi Arabia and Serbia, conducted joint military drills with arms clients to build operational interoperability, and supported licensed production, as seen in examples like Chinese engines powering Turkish TB-2 drones. These steps foster dependency, deepen defense ties, and export China’s military doctrine and technology standards.
Strategically, China views these reputational risks as an acceptable cost in pursuit of a broader objective: reshaping the global security order. Arms exports are a lever to dilute U.S.-led alliance structures, normalize Chinese surveillance and technology governance models, and reinvest export revenues into advanced R&D, including hypersonic weapons and next-generation missile systems. In this pragmatic calculus, the global arms trade is less about weapons and more about influence—laying the foundations for a multipolar world where China’s defense partnerships rival those of traditional powers.
Dual-Use Technologies: Power, Peril, and Proliferation
A defining feature of China’s rise in the global arms trade is its calculated exploitation of dual-use technologies—civilian systems that can be rapidly adapted for military applications. At the heart of this strategy is the seamless integration of commercially dominant platforms into defense exports. For instance, China’s global leadership in the drone market has allowed it to pivot models like the CH-4, Wing Loong II, and WZ-7 from civilian surveillance or agricultural applications to sophisticated military roles such as precision strikes and reconnaissance. These UAVs are now fixtures in the arsenals of countries across the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, many of which are priced out of Western systems or barred due to political constraints.
In the maritime domain, the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) plays a similar role. Originally focused on commercial shipbuilding, CSSC now exports naval hulls, propulsion systems, and electronic suites tailored to the defense needs of client states. These ships are often integrated with Chinese-made radar systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and missile launchers, making them force multipliers for countries with limited indigenous defense manufacturing. What distinguishes this approach is the embedding of such capabilities in dual-use infrastructure projects—like port developments and Smart City platforms—where systems marketed as commercial or civilian can be militarized swiftly under strategic duress or by design.
While this model enhances China’s geopolitical influence, it also introduces significant international security and ethical risks. Proliferation concerns are mounting as Beijing’s export policies remain relatively lax. Sophisticated surveillance, strike, or command-and-control technologies are increasingly accessible to fragile states, such as Sudan or Venezuela, and to non-state actors operating in conflict zones. This diffusion of advanced military tools without robust end-use monitoring undermines international arms control efforts and raises the risk of destabilization in volatile regions.
Another major implication lies in authoritarian empowerment. Many of China’s exports—particularly digital surveillance systems and AI-based monitoring tools—have been adopted by governments with poor human rights records. Systems capable of facial recognition, social media monitoring, and mass surveillance have been installed in Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Serbia, among others. These technologies bolster regime control and erode civil liberties, often under the banner of public safety or infrastructure modernization. This represents a new form of digital authoritarianism exported under the guise of economic development.
Compounding these challenges is the growing incidence of gray-zone escalation. The indistinct boundary between commercial and military technologies makes attribution and accountability difficult when such tools are deployed in conflict. For instance, Chinese drones have been used by multiple sides in the Yemeni civil war, while Chinese-built telecom infrastructure has reportedly been repurposed for military intelligence gathering. In such scenarios, China can plausibly deny involvement, even as its exports alter conflict dynamics and reshape battlefield capabilities.
Ultimately, China’s dual-use export strategy is a direct manifestation of its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) doctrine. It enables Beijing to convert its commercial technology base into global strategic influence, all while externalizing the political, legal, and humanitarian dilemmas associated with the misuse of advanced technologies. As the world grapples with the consequences, the urgency for international norms on dual-use technology governance becomes ever more apparent.
From Bullets to Battle Networks: China’s Transformative Arms Export Shift
China’s evolution as an arms exporter has undergone a striking transformation over the last decade. No longer confined to the export of low-end, commodity-grade weapons like small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, Beijing has shifted its focus to high-value, integrated military systems. Between 2013 and 2023, China’s exports of combat aircraft grew by 310%, naval vessels by 290%, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by a staggering 400%, according to SIPRI data. This upward trajectory reflects a deliberate effort to position China as a serious competitor to traditional defense exporters in the high-end systems market.
Flagship platforms underscore this shift. The J-10CE multirole fighters sold to Pakistan represent China’s entry into the jet fighter export market, while submarines like the S26T Yuan-class, procured by Thailand, indicate growing confidence in Chinese naval technologies. Similarly, the HQ-22 (FK-3) air defense systems delivered to Serbia and Wing Loong 3 UAVs exported to Saudi Arabia and Algeria mark China’s emergence as a player in integrated air and drone warfare technologies. These sales are not isolated transactions but part of a broader strategy to entrench China’s defense footprint across multiple geographies.
China’s global penetration reveals a strategic pattern. In the Middle East, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE are procuring Chinese UAVs and missile systems, often in parallel to Western equipment. In Southeast Asia, countries like Pakistan, Myanmar, and Laos are outfitted with Chinese frigates, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and C4ISR suites. African partners—Algeria, Nigeria, and Djibouti among them—receive corvettes, tanks, and coastal defense systems. Even parts of Europe, notably Serbia, are integrating Chinese drones and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems into their forces, often in ways incompatible with NATO interoperability norms. Notably, China has also supplied subsystems, such as engines, for Turkish drones like the Akıncı, enabling a quiet diffusion of Chinese technology even into countries not directly seen as arms clients.
The naval domain is where China’s export dominance is perhaps most visible. In Bangladesh, Chinese platforms account for 78% of the country’s arms imports between 2014 and 2023—including two Ming-class submarines and a series of C13B corvettes. Thailand’s $1 billion deal for the S26T submarine, though currently stalled over German engine restrictions, highlights Beijing’s reach into high-end sub-surface warfare markets. In Pakistan, four Type 054A/P guided-missile frigates now form the backbone of its navy’s modernization effort, complete with LY-80N surface-to-air missile systems and Chinese sensors and combat systems.
Beyond hardware, China’s push into the digital and cyber defense realms represents a silent but potent expansion. The China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) has sold radar systems—such as the JY-27A anti-stealth radar—to more than 17 countries, including Venezuela. These systems often operate in tandem with Chinese-made electronic warfare suites and integrated command systems, enabling end-to-end battlefield management. The export of network-centric warfare systems—such as those now used by Algeria—creates deep digital dependencies. Moreover, Beijing’s broader export of telecom infrastructure through firms like Huawei often includes dual-use capabilities, raising concerns that exported systems may serve intelligence functions or facilitate digital authoritarianism in client states.
The strategic implications of this export model are profound. China is no longer simply exporting arms; it is exporting entire military ecosystems. This includes not just platforms, but doctrinal alignment, technical standards, and operational dependencies. For instance, Pakistan’s JF-17 Block III fighters use Chinese PL-15 long-range missiles and datalinks, locking them into Chinese logistics and upgrade pathways. Egypt’s acquisition of the Type 071E landing platform dock (LPD) necessitates PLA-style training and maintenance frameworks. Similarly, Serbian air defenses now rely on Chinese early-warning radars and are incompatible with Western NATO-integrated systems.
Ultimately, China’s export strategy is reshaping global military architecture by rewiring it around Chinese technology and standards. As more countries adopt Chinese command, control, and communication protocols—particularly in drones, air defense, and maritime systems—they become embedded in a technological ecosystem closely tied to PLA practices and platforms. This not only ensures long-term revenue for China’s defense industry but also extends its strategic influence far beyond its borders, challenging the West’s monopoly on defense interoperability and redefining the rules of global arms diplomacy.
Global Implications: Security, Dependence, and Competition
China’s evolving role as a defense exporter brings with it a new set of geopolitical realities. While its systems are often more affordable and politically flexible, concerns about quality, accountability, and strategic intent persist. Chinese arms exports are rarely stand-alone transactions—they are embedded within broader diplomatic, economic, and security agendas. From base agreements in Djibouti to military training missions in Africa and Southeast Asia, China’s approach mirrors a holistic model of influence projection.
For the global community, this evolution raises important questions. How will the diffusion of Chinese military technologies reshape regional balances of power? What frameworks are needed to regulate dual-use technology exports? And how should traditional exporters respond to a new competitor whose model is rooted in central planning, global reach, and political flexibility?
As China continues to expand its defense export footprint, the world must grapple with the opportunities and risks that come with it. From supporting peacekeeping in fragile regions to enabling authoritarian surveillance, the impact of Chinese arms sales will be felt well beyond the battlefield.
Further Reading and Sources
- SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
- UNIDIR Research on Dual-Use Technologies
- GESDA Global Science Breakthrough Radar
- RAND Corporation Reports on Military-Civil Fusion
- CSIS Reports on China’s Military Exports
Would you like a visual map showing China’s top arms export recipients over the past decade?
