India’s Joint Military Doctrines: Strategic Evolution in Amphibious and Cyber Operations

New Doctrines for a Multi-Domain Future

In 2024, India took a decisive step toward modernizing its military strategy by unveiling two pivotal joint doctrines that reflect the evolving landscape of warfare—one dominated by amphibious challenges in the Indo-Pacific and the growing threat of cyber warfare. The Doctrine for Amphibious Operations sets the foundation for integrated land-sea-air campaigns, aimed at enhancing India’s ability to project power across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This document outlines how joint forces should respond not only to full-scale conflict, such as island capture or maritime interdiction, but also to non-traditional missions like disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, reinforcing India’s image as both a security provider and stabilizing force in the region.

The doctrine’s significance is amplified by intensifying geopolitical rivalries in the IOR, particularly with China’s expanding maritime footprint through dual-use infrastructure and military outposts. By articulating a unified approach to amphibious operations, India is seeking to overcome historical limitations in inter-service coordination and build the capacity to conduct expeditionary missions from the Andaman & Nicobar Islands to East Africa. It envisions rapid-response task forces that combine naval strike capabilities, airlift support, and ground maneuver units operating under a joint command structure—a leap forward from siloed operational planning.

Equally transformative is the Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations, which redefines cyberspace as a “global common” akin to maritime and outer space domains. Recognizing that future conflicts will likely begin—or be fought entirely—in digital terrain, the doctrine establishes a comprehensive framework for the armed forces to conduct cyber defense, offensive operations, and resilience-building in critical information infrastructure. The initiative was prompted by a steep rise in cyberattacks targeting Indian institutions, and by the growing sophistication of adversaries, particularly China, in using AI-enabled and quantum-safe cyber weapons.

For the first time, India’s tri-services now have a shared strategic architecture to deal with cyber conflict, moving away from ad hoc responses to a proactive and unified model. It places responsibility on the Defence Cyber Agency to coordinate with civilian institutions and international partners while enhancing offensive readiness. Together, these doctrines mark India’s transition from reactive posture to anticipatory, multi-domain planning—essential for a future where wars may be won as much with code and cables as with ships and soldiers.

The Role and Limits of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)

At the center of India’s push toward jointness is the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a position created in 2019 after decades of deliberation dating back to the Kargil Review Committee and Shekatkar Committee recommendations. The CDS heads the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and serves as the principal military advisor to the Defence Minister, responsible for tri-service capability development, procurement coordination, and doctrinal integration. Notably, the CDS plays a key role in the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), advising on strategic deterrence and second-strike capability.

However, the CDS’s authority remains limited. While tasked with fostering inter-service synergy, the position does not entail direct command over the Army, Navy, or Air Force chiefs. Furthermore, the CDS only controls the revenue budget—not capital expenditure—placing structural constraints on the ability to drive deep reforms. Despite these limitations, the CDS is essential to realizing the operational objectives laid out in India’s new joint doctrines.

Comparing Global Military Models: Where India Stands

India’s recently released joint doctrines signal a shift toward multi-domain readiness, but when measured against global military benchmarks, they also highlight critical capability gaps. In the realm of amphibious warfare, global leaders like the United States operate with unmatched capacity. The U.S. Marine Corps maintains nine fully integrated expeditionary strike groups, capable of launching rapid-response operations anywhere in the world. China has significantly expanded its PLA Marine Corps, now exceeding 40,000 troops, and has strategically embedded its forces on artificial islands across the South China Sea—demonstrating both scale and long-term strategic intent. Meanwhile, European powers such as France and the UK field elite, environment-specific units like the Royal Marines Commandos, optimized for Arctic and desert warfare.

India, by contrast, has just one amphibious division, primarily oriented toward the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). While the 2024 Amphibious Operations Doctrine formalizes joint land-sea-air strategies, it lacks the specialization and operational reach seen in leading militaries. The doctrine does not yet account for extreme environmental warfare or global power projection. India’s amphibious strength remains regionally focused and logistically constrained. Without specialized training regimens or equipment adapted to niche conditions, India’s capacity to conduct expeditionary or multinational amphibious operations remains limited in both scope and agility.

Global Comparison: India vs. Key Militaries

A. Amphibious Capabilities

B. Cyber Warfare

The cyber warfare domain paints an even more pronounced disparity. The United States’ Cyber Command commands a workforce of over 20,000 personnel and operates on a $13 billion budget, integrating offensive and defensive cyber operations at scale. China’s PLA Strategic Support Force takes a more expansive view, merging cyber, electronic, and space warfare capabilities under a unified command structure. This includes the deployment of quantum-encrypted communications and AI-assisted cyber weapons—making China a formidable adversary in both traditional and grey-zone conflicts. Meanwhile, Israel’s famed Unit 8200 exemplifies the cutting edge of cyber-intelligence fusion, combining state-driven operations with private sector innovation to fuel its AI-enabled cyber offense.

India’s Defence Cyber Agency, while a step in the right direction, remains underpowered in comparison. Launched in 2019, it suffers from inadequate staffing, limited offensive doctrine, and structural reliance on civilian entities like CERT-In for threat mitigation. While the development of indigenous technologies such as DRDO’s Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) link and the operationalization of the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) mark important progress, they fall short of forming a cohesive military-grade cyber deterrent. India currently lacks a unified cyber command with full-spectrum capabilities, making it vulnerable in an era where information warfare is often the first strike.

Strategic Challenges and Opportunities

India’s pursuit of joint military operations has long been undermined by institutional fragmentation. Although the creation of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2002 and the establishment of the Andaman & Nicobar Command represented early steps toward tri-service coordination, these entities were never granted operational control over critical assets. Consequently, their impact remained largely symbolic. The 2017 Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF) was emblematic of these limitations—it was widely criticized for being excessively Army-centric, lacking joint operational clarity, and even containing plagiarized content. These shortcomings underscored a deeper issue: the absence of a unified vision for multi-domain integration.

In cyberspace, India faces a growing onslaught of sophisticated attacks, many of which are linked to Chinese state-sponsored entities. These cyber threats target vital sectors such as energy, finance, and transportation, with Indian organizations now facing over 2,100 cyberattacks per week on average. While defensive infrastructure has improved—including advances in quantum key distribution (QKD) research and the designation of vital sectors under the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC)—India’s cyber strategy still leans heavily on reactive defense. The lack of a centralized, military-grade offensive cyber command leaves critical gaps. Moreover, continued reliance on foreign-manufactured, often Chinese-origin, digital hardware creates persistent vulnerabilities across India’s communications and surveillance infrastructure.

To close these gaps, India must urgently transition from doctrinal intent to operational reality. This begins with fast-tracking the implementation of unified theatre commands—particularly a dedicated command focused on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) that can integrate amphibious, air, naval, and cyber assets into a cohesive fighting force. Indigenous technology development must also be prioritized, especially in secure encryption systems, quantum communications, and trusted hardware supply chains. Equally essential is the cultivation of a civil-military cyber innovation ecosystem. India could benefit from emulating the Israeli model, where elite cyber units like Unit 8200 feed talent directly into the private sector, creating a virtuous loop of defense innovation, national resilience, and commercial competitiveness.

Conclusion: From Doctrines to Deployment

India’s joint military doctrines are an important step toward modernizing the country’s defense posture across multiple domains. However, doctrine without enforcement is inert. To counter China’s expanding hybrid warfare capabilities—from cyberspace intrusions to maritime gray-zone operations—India must move beyond conceptual frameworks and build operationally integrated forces. The Chief of Defence Staff has a pivotal role in driving the transition from “joint on paper” to “joint in practice,” especially through theatre commands, indigenous tech acceleration, and institutional reform.

These doctrines lay the foundation, but the structure still needs to be built. As a prominent analyst put it, “Doctrines are floor tiles, not the ceiling. Integration wins wars; paperwork does not.” The coming decade will test whether India can turn strategic vision into warfighting readiness in the cyber and maritime domains.