International Defense Security & Technology Your trusted Source for News, Research and Analysis
Related Articles
The cryptographic apocalypse is no longer a theoretical concept. With quantum computers approaching the threshold of breaking RSA-3072 encryption—potentially within the next decade—global digital security hangs in the balance. Recognizing this existential threat, the U.S. government has initiated an unprecedented overhaul of cryptographic infrastructure. This effort, led by NIST, includes the finalization of three post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards and mandates a comprehensive migration across all critical sectors. Adversaries are already engaged in “harvest now, decrypt later” campaigns, collecting encrypted data today for decryption in a quantum-powered tomorrow. The transition to quantum-safe algorithms is therefore not merely technical—it is a strategic imperative for both national defense and economic resilience.
Introduction:
The world stands at the threshold of a quantum revolution that promises to reshape not just computation but the foundations of digital security. Quantum computers, with their ability to solve complex mathematical problems exponentially faster than classical machines, threaten to render current cryptographic standards obsolete. Public-key algorithms such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curve cryptography—which underpin secure communication, online banking, digital identity, and national security—are particularly vulnerable. Recognizing this looming threat, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has spearheaded a global effort to standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, ensuring a secure transition into the post-quantum era.
Although today’s quantum machines are still in their early stages, progress is accelerating. Research breakthroughs from tech giants like IBM, Google, and startups alike are steadily increasing quantum bit (qubit) counts and reducing error rates. Experts estimate that within the next decade, large-scale quantum computers could break RSA-2048 and similar encryption schemes—jeopardizing not only future communications but also sensitive data already intercepted and stored by adversaries through “harvest now, decrypt later” strategies. The threat is not theoretical; it is a ticking clock against long-term data confidentiality across sectors including finance, defense, and healthcare.
Proactive preparation is no longer optional. The transition to quantum-safe cryptography is one of the most complex and urgent security upgrades in modern history. With data lifespans ranging from 10 to over 50 years, institutions must adopt crypto-agile systems capable of rapid algorithm replacement and start integrating NIST-approved post-quantum algorithms today. The race is on—not just to protect digital privacy and integrity, but to preserve global trust in the digital infrastructure that underpins modern civilization.
Vulnerability of Asymmetric cryptography or public-key cryptography
Today’s digital infrastructure relies heavily on asymmetric cryptography—also known as public-key cryptography—to ensure secure communications, authenticate users, and enable encrypted transactions across the internet. This system uses a pair of keys: a public key that can be openly shared, and a private key that is kept secret. Algorithms such as RSA, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), and Diffie-Hellman are the cornerstones of this model, leveraging the computational difficulty of problems like prime factorization and discrete logarithms to protect sensitive data. However, while this approach is both practical and scalable, it is increasingly under threat from the growing capabilities of quantum computing.
Unlike symmetric encryption, which uses a shared secret key and is relatively more resilient to quantum attacks, asymmetric encryption is especially vulnerable to the power of quantum algorithms. Shor’s algorithm—one of the most well-known quantum algorithms—can factor large numbers and compute discrete logarithms exponentially faster than classical computers. In essence, this renders the hard mathematical problems that underpin public-key encryption solvable in a feasible amount of time. As quantum processors evolve, they will increasingly erode the foundational security assumptions of asymmetric cryptography.
Though current quantum systems have not yet reached the scale needed to break modern encryption, the trajectory of innovation points toward a future where such feats are possible. For example, factoring a 1,024-bit RSA key would theoretically require only 2,048 ideal qubits. However, because physical qubits are error-prone, each logical qubit may require up to 1,000 physical qubits. This means cracking RSA-1024 could demand over a million physical qubits—far beyond current capabilities. As Professor Bart Preneel of KU Leuven explains, while we are advancing, the engineering challenges remain immense: quantum systems are highly sensitive to environmental factors like heat and vibration, which makes scaling difficult.
Nonetheless, experts warn that a quantum computer capable of breaking 2,000-bit RSA encryption could be developed by 2030 with sufficient funding—estimated at around one billion dollars. Given the long lifecycle of sensitive data and the reality of “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks, the urgency of transitioning to quantum-resistant cryptography is not diminished by current hardware limitations. This is why institutions like NIST are actively standardizing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, aiming to create secure alternatives that can withstand quantum-enabled attacks. The clock is ticking: while the exact quantum tipping point remains uncertain, the need for preparation is absolute
For a deeper understanding on Quantum Computer threat and post-quantum cryptography Please visit: Quantum Computing and Post-Quantum Cryptography: Safeguarding Digital Infrastructure in the Quantum Era
Security Risk
While quantum computing heralds a new era of computational capability, it also introduces unprecedented security risks that challenge the foundations of modern cryptography. Many widely used cryptographic protocols—such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman—will be vulnerable to quantum algorithms that can solve complex mathematical problems exponentially faster than classical computers. As this technology matures over the next decade, the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of digital communications, business transactions, and customer data may be severely compromised. A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could render today’s encryption obsolete, threatening the trust that underpins the internet and digital commerce.
U.S. national security agencies have taken note. The National Security Agency (NSA), whose core mission includes safeguarding classified and sensitive information, has been proactive in warning federal agencies and private industry about the looming quantum threat. In a landmark move in 2015, the NSA advised organizations to halt investments in Suite B elliptic curve cryptography, signaling a dramatic pivot in cryptographic strategy. Instead, it recommended preparing for the adoption of quantum-resistant algorithms, acknowledging that transitioning to new cryptographic standards can take 5 to 10 years due to the complexity of modern IT systems and compliance requirements.
The urgency of this guidance stems from a critical strategic risk: the arrival of a large-scale quantum computer may not be publicly disclosed. Nation-states or other actors developing quantum capabilities in secret could exploit this advantage to decrypt sensitive communications without detection, effectively breaching systems assumed to be secure.
In this context, even encrypted historical data—such as financial records, health information, or intellectual property—could be retroactively exposed through so-called “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks. This possibility places tremendous pressure on organizations to future-proof their cryptographic infrastructure before such breakthroughs occur.
The “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” Threat
A major concern driving the rapid shift to PQC is the emerging tactic of “harvest now, decrypt later.” Cyber adversaries are already stockpiling encrypted datasets from sectors such as finance, defense, and healthcare. These data stores are intended for future decryption once quantum capabilities become sufficient. Transition periods offer especially fertile ground for attackers, as legacy systems are phased out and new ones come online.
Further compounding the threat, AI-enhanced cryptanalysis is accelerating the timeline. For instance, Microsoft’s Majorana 1 quantum processor has demonstrated early indicators of capabilities that could shorten the window to full quantum decryption. Critical sectors with long-lived sensitive data—such as energy, healthcare, and banking—are particularly exposed.
Governments, enterprises, and cryptographic researchers must accelerate the development and deployment of post-quantum cryptographic solutions to ensure that digital infrastructure remains resilient. Failing to act in time could compromise the confidentiality and authenticity of vast swaths of global data and communication.
Post-Quantum Cryptography: Building a Resilient Future
As the quantum era looms, organizations across the globe are investing in post-quantum cryptography (PQC)—a new class of cryptographic algorithms designed to remain secure against both classical and quantum adversaries. Unlike conventional encryption methods, which rely on mathematical problems vulnerable to quantum algorithms like Shor’s, PQC aims to future-proof secure communication while remaining compatible with current internet protocols and infrastructure. The urgency to develop and adopt these algorithms stems from the very real possibility that a powerful quantum computer could emerge within the next couple of decades—if not sooner.
However, the transition to quantum-resistant cryptography is not a simple upgrade—it is a massive, multi-layered transformation. According to experts like Bill Becker, VP of product management at SafeNet AT, the process involves designing and vetting new algorithms, standardizing them through global consensus, integrating them into cryptographic protocols, and finally embedding those protocols into hardware and software products. Given the scale and complexity of global digital systems, this transition could take as long as 20 years. Organizations must act now to ensure that critical data and infrastructure are protected against the quantum threats of tomorrow.
Recognizing this, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched a landmark international competition in 2017 to identify and standardize the most promising quantum-resistant algorithms. Now in its final round, this effort has brought together contributions from academic institutions, private sector researchers, and cryptographic experts worldwide. From an initial pool of 69 submissions, candidates have been rigorously tested for performance, security, resilience against known attacks, and implementation viability. The process has emphasized transparency and community feedback to build a strong, scientific consensus on the most reliable algorithms for future use.
NIST plans to finalize its selections for standard quantum-safe algorithms by 2024, covering both encryption and digital signatures—vital for data confidentiality and authentication. Though official standards are still forthcoming, forward-looking organizations are encouraged to begin assessing their cryptographic assets and preparing migration plans. Waiting until quantum computers arrive may be too late; proactive adoption of post-quantum strategies is essential to safeguard national security, commercial assets, and user privacy in the coming quantum era.
Quantum-Resistant Cryptography: Symmetric and Asymmetric Perspectives
Modern cryptographic systems rely on a combination of symmetric and asymmetric (public-key) algorithms to secure everything from digital identities and secure websites to online banking and blockchain protocols. Asymmetric algorithms such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) underpin public key exchange and digital signature functions. However, these algorithms are particularly vulnerable to the advent of quantum computing. Quantum algorithms like Shor’s algorithm can factor large integers and compute discrete logarithms exponentially faster than classical counterparts, potentially rendering RSA and ECC obsolete once sufficiently powerful quantum machines are realized.
In contrast, symmetric cryptographic algorithms—such as AES for encryption and SHA-2/256 for hashing—are considered significantly more resilient to quantum threats. Quantum attacks on symmetric algorithms primarily exploit Grover’s algorithm, which offers a quadratic speedup for brute-force key search. However, this speedup can be effectively countered by simply doubling the key size. For instance, AES-256 provides a robust defense even in the face of Grover-enhanced attacks. Moreover, symmetric cryptographic operations remain relatively fast and efficient, and quantum computers—due to their high error rates, limited coherence times, and slow operation speeds—are unlikely to pose a practical threat to symmetric systems in the foreseeable future. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has affirmed that symmetric schemes like AES-128 and SHA-256 meet the security criteria for post-quantum cryptography with minor adjustments.
The real transformation is occurring in the realm of asymmetric cryptography. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to replace vulnerable public-key systems with algorithms that are secure against both classical and quantum adversaries. NIST’s global PQC standardization effort, which began in 2016, culminated in August 2024 with the announcement of the first three standardized post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. These standards are based on different mathematical principles to ensure diversity and redundancy in case a particular approach is compromised in the future.
Among these, lattice-based cryptography has emerged as a cornerstone. It leverages the mathematical complexity of high-dimensional lattice problems, particularly the Learning With Errors (LWE) and Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), which remain difficult even for quantum computers. Lattice-based cryptographic systems are not only efficient and scalable but also versatile, offering both encryption and signature functionalities. FIPS 203 introduces CRYSTALS-Kyber, a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism designed to replace RSA and ECC for general-purpose encryption. FIPS 204 defines CRYSTALS-Dilithium, a signature scheme also based on lattice mathematics, notable for its balance between performance and security. FALCON, another lattice-based digital signature algorithm expected to be standardized as FN-DSA later in 2024, offers extremely compact signatures and is ideal for constrained devices, though it is technically more complex to implement.
Another key category is hash-based cryptography, which constructs digital signatures using well-established hash functions like SHA-2 and SHA-3. Hash-based systems offer quantum resistance rooted in the inherent one-way nature of cryptographic hash functions. While early hash-based signature schemes, such as those using one-time signatures, were limited in scope due to statefulness and signature volume constraints, more advanced constructions like Merkle trees and stateless algorithms have overcome many of these challenges. FIPS 205 outlines SPHINCS+, a stateless hash-based digital signature algorithm that is slower and produces larger signatures than its lattice-based counterparts but is prized for its conservative design and mathematical diversity. It serves as a vital backup in scenarios where lattice-based algorithms may be compromised.
Code-based cryptography, built on error-correcting codes like those used in the McEliece cryptosystem, offers another avenue of quantum resistance. These systems have stood the test of time since the 1970s and remain unbroken, even in the face of quantum threats. However, their primary drawback lies in the large key sizes required for secure implementation. In March 2025, NIST officially included a code-based alternative—Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC)—in its cryptographic portfolio to diversify algorithmic defenses. Code-based approaches have proven effective for encryption tasks, though they are less practical for digital signatures due to their structural overhead.
Multivariate cryptography is another class of post-quantum systems, based on the difficulty of solving multivariate polynomial equations over finite fields. While this area has seen several promising proposals—such as Rainbow, a multivariate signature scheme—many of them have succumbed to cryptanalytic attacks over time. Nonetheless, multivariate systems remain under study, especially for use in digital signatures where novel configurations may offer efficiency or niche applicability.
Finally, a handful of alternative schemes that do not fall into the previously mentioned families are under consideration. These include cryptographic systems based on supersingular isogenies and algebraic structures like braid groups. Though conceptually intriguing, these systems often lack the maturity or cryptanalytic scrutiny to be confidently adopted as standards at present. Nevertheless, NIST has kept the door open to these ideas by including a broader array of submissions in its evaluation process.
In total, NIST has selected four algorithms for initial standardization. CRYSTALS-Kyber will be the preferred choice for general encryption due to its compact key sizes and operational speed. For digital signatures, CRYSTALS-Dilithium will serve as the primary standard, with FALCON recommended for applications where signature size is a limiting factor. SPHINCS+, though larger and slower, brings the advantage of being hash-based and thus independent of the mathematical structures underpinning the other three. NIST’s strategy of diversifying its portfolio ensures that even if a specific mathematical assumption is broken, alternative algorithms remain viable.
In the transition toward quantum-safe infrastructure, NIST advises organizations to assess all systems that currently use public-key cryptography. Preparing for migration involves notifying IT teams and vendors, understanding the cryptographic dependencies of existing applications, and engaging with NIST’s ongoing guidance for implementation. The final standards are expected to be published by 2026, but all draft algorithms are currently available for testing and integration planning. Post-quantum cryptography represents not only a critical shift in digital security but also a proactive defense against the next era of computational power.
The Standardization Milestone: NIST’s Quantum Shield
Standardization is the backbone of the post-quantum transition. It guarantees interoperability, consistent security levels, and trust across industries. NIST’s open and transparent process ensures that post-quantum algorithms are vetted rigorously and integrated effectively, reducing the risks of fragmented or incompatible solutions.
After nearly a decade of rigorous analysis and international collaboration, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalized its first three post-quantum cryptographic standards in August 2024, marking the most consequential overhaul of global encryption protocols since the introduction of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001. These standards form the backbone of the global transition toward quantum-resilient digital infrastructure.
Government Mandates: Timelines and Consequences
The urgency of transitioning to quantum-safe cryptography is underscored by formal mandates, particularly for National Security Systems (NSS). The NSA’s Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 (CNSA 2.0) requires all NSS to adopt PQC standards by 2033. High-risk systems are subject to an accelerated timeline, with a deadline set for 2030. This urgency is driven by the longevity requirement of classified data—”Top Secret” information must remain secure for 50 to 75 years, compelling immediate proactive countermeasures.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working in partnership with NIST, has outlined a quantum migration roadmap. Organizations are expected to conduct thorough inventories of their cryptographic systems, identify vulnerabilities to quantum threats, and develop prioritized transition plans based on data sensitivity, operational criticality, and infrastructure dependencies. Crucially, the DHS advises against deploying non-NIST solutions that could introduce compatibility or compliance issues down the road.
As the ISACA Quantum Security Report of 2025 starkly warns, “Enterprises that wait until quantum computers reach full potential will be too late.”
Implementation Hurdles: Beyond Algorithm Selection
Despite standardization progress, implementing PQC at scale poses significant technical challenges. One of the most pressing issues is performance. Lattice-based algorithms like ML-DSA require two to ten times the computational power of their classical counterparts. Signature sizes, for example, increase dramatically—ML-DSA signatures weigh in at approximately 2.5 KB compared to just 0.1 KB for ECDSA. These increases strain memory-constrained devices, particularly in the IoT ecosystem. Moreover, the added latency in handshake protocols, such as TLS, can reduce performance by up to 40%.
Interoperability is another challenge. A successful transition requires updates across multiple cryptographic frameworks, including TLS 1.3, IPsec, X.509, and JOSE. Unfortunately, many embedded and industrial systems lack the firmware flexibility needed for such sweeping upgrades. Surveys show that nearly 60% of industrial control systems do not support crypto-agile architectures.
From a financial perspective, the burden is heavy. The U.S. government estimates that updating federal systems alone will cost approximately $7.1 billion between 2025 and 2035.
The global transition from current cryptographic standards to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) introduces a host of complex challenges, primarily driven by the deeply entrenched and interconnected nature of modern digital infrastructure. Replacing widely deployed encryption protocols across governments, financial institutions, cloud services, and embedded systems will not be as simple as patching or updating software. The effort requires a coordinated, large-scale reengineering of cryptographic ecosystems—many of which have dependencies that are difficult to fully map.
Although some vendors are already offering post-quantum encryption solutions, adopting these pre-standard technologies prematurely can create more problems than they solve. Diverging from the upcoming NIST-approved standards, expected to be finalized by 2026, may result in significant compatibility, interoperability, and cost issues. Early adoption of non-standardized algorithms could lead to security fragmentation and necessitate another migration once official standards are released.
The scale of the effort involved in developing, validating, and deploying entirely new classes of cryptographic algorithms cannot be overstated. In previous transitions—from DES to AES, or from shorter RSA keys to longer ones—the security improvements were framed in terms of “bits of security.” This paradigm measures how resistant an algorithm is to brute-force attacks by classical computers. For example, an algorithm with 128-bit security requires computational effort equivalent to exhaustively searching a 128-bit keyspace. However, quantum threats invalidate many assumptions behind this classical model, demanding not just stronger algorithms, but entirely new mathematical foundations.
Complicating matters further is the fact that the transition must be proactive. Quantum computers capable of breaking RSA or ECC may still be years away, but the threat of “harvest now, decrypt later” looms large. Adversaries may be capturing encrypted data today with the intention of decrypting it once quantum capabilities mature. Therefore, the urgency to act is not just about preparing for future attacks, but about safeguarding present-day data that must remain confidential long into the future.
As U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas emphasized in March 2021:
“The transition to post-quantum encryption algorithms is as much dependent on the development of such algorithms as it is on their adoption. While the former is already ongoing, planning for the latter remains in its infancy. We must prepare for it now to protect the confidentiality of data that already exists today and remains sensitive in the future.”
Ultimately, the post-quantum transition will be one of the most significant and technically demanding cryptographic migrations in history. It will require not only new tools and standards, but also global cooperation, education, and long-term strategic planning to ensure a secure and orderly deployment.
Global Momentum: Regulations and Innovations
Governments and industry bodies worldwide are moving swiftly to address the quantum threat. In the European Union, the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) mandates the inclusion of quantum-resistant components in certified hardware. In France, the national cybersecurity agency ANSSI promotes hybrid cryptographic deployments, blending classical and PQC algorithms to smooth the transition.
Private industry is also rising to the occasion. The Real World PQC Workshop in March 2025 brought together stakeholders from AWS, Meta, and NIST to address real-world deployment challenges. Meanwhile, hardware vendors like Rambus are releasing solutions such as the QSE-IP-86, a hardware security module designed to accelerate ML-KEM operations within large-scale data centers.
A phased timeline has emerged for adoption. From 2024 to 2025, organizations are focused on inventory and planning. The 2026 to 2028 window is earmarked for early CNSA 2.0 compliance and pilot deployments of hybrid models. By 2030, high-risk government systems must complete the transition, with full compliance required across all NSS by 2033.
Strategic Recommendations for Organizations
Preparing for quantum-era threats demands a holistic, defense-in-depth approach that extends beyond simply adopting new encryption algorithms. Organizations must begin with comprehensive cryptographic audits to identify legacy systems and data that rely on vulnerable public-key cryptography. From there, they should implement Zero Trust architectures and network segmentation to contain potential breaches and reduce attack surfaces. It’s equally critical to develop phased migration plans for replacing at-risk protocols and systems with quantum-resistant alternatives.
To prepare for the quantum era, organizations must begin with a comprehensive audit of their cryptographic assets. This includes identifying all systems utilizing RSA, ECDSA, or Diffie-Hellman and tagging any sensitive data requiring more than ten years of protection—such as intellectual property or health records.
Next, companies should prioritize crypto-agility. This involves integrating modular cryptographic libraries, like the Rambus Quantum Safe Library, which allow for algorithm replacement without complete system overhauls.
The transition should proceed in tiers. Tier 1 systems—such as certificate authorities and firmware signing infrastructure—should be addressed first. Tier 2 includes systems processing financial and medical data. Finally, Tier 3 systems involve internal communication tools and lower-risk services.
Adopting hybrid cryptography can further ease the migration. Combining well-tested classical algorithms like AES-256 with PQC methods such as ML-KEM can ensure both backward compatibility and future resilience. Active participation in groups like the Quantum Economic Development Consortium (QED-C) can help organizations stay aligned with best practices and evolving standards.
Additionally, organizations should prioritize the re-encryption of sensitive data with long retention requirements using post-quantum cryptographic methods to ensure future confidentiality. Maintaining agility is key—security teams must continuously monitor advancements in both quantum computing and cryptanalysis, allowing them to rapidly adapt their strategies as threats evolve. Proactive planning today ensures a smoother, less disruptive transition tomorrow and positions organizations as leaders in quantum-resilient cybersecurity.
The Road Ahead: Challenges and Predictions
The coming years are likely to be turbulent. Between 2026 and 2028, a wave of IoT breaches is expected as many legacy devices fail to support PQC upgrades. By 2030, targeted quantum ransomware campaigns may cripple infrastructure still reliant on outdated cryptographic protocols. By 2035, cyber insurance providers are expected to make quantum-safe certification a prerequisite for coverage.
To future-proof against potential breakthroughs in quantum cryptanalysis—especially against lattice-based cryptography—NIST continues to evaluate backup schemes, including multivariate and isogeny-based systems. This proactive strategy ensures continued resilience, even in the face of unforeseen vulnerabilities.
“Legacy systems won’t lose wars—but slow software updates will.”
—DARPA Principle, Adapted for the Quantum Era
Conclusion: The Cryptographic Crossroads
The migration to post-quantum cryptography represents the largest cryptographic transition in history—an immense, decade-long, trillion-dollar global effort. As NIST’s Dustin Moody succinctly puts it, “Do not wait for future standards. Start using FIPS 203-205 now.”
Organizations that delay this transformation face not just increased risk of data compromise, but technological irrelevance in a world reshaped by quantum computing. With governments enforcing compliance, adversaries actively harvesting data, and hardware vendors delivering quantum-safe infrastructure, the very foundation of digital trust is being reengineered—lattice by lattice.
Additional Resources
